Situation-anchored Person: PRO as a radically underspecified pronoun
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In this paper, I present arguments against the movement theory of control (MTC) coming from agreement and binding facts in German and argue for an event-based version of the Agree theory of control (ATC), as developed by Landau (2000, 2003, 2006). In particular, I will argue for a presuppositional account of pronominal reference, in which a pronoun's morphological features act as restrictions on the individual and situational argument of its nominal core that consists in the abstract predicate *participant* (x,s). In this scenario, PRO is analysed as a radically underspecified pronoun with its reference being primarily determined by binding its situation argument to the event argument of the higher verb in cases of obligatory control (OC).

A) Problems of the MTC - Agreement: German displays nominal predicates that show agreement in Number, Case and Gender with the subject, or more generally with the Case that the subject of the predicate obtains during the derivation. Nominal predicates agree with their local subject also in control infinitives and show Nominative Case, as is illustrated in (1a). This can be explained by assuming that either PRO is assigned Nominative, rather than null Case in (1a), or - in a raising analysis of PRO - that the predicate agrees with the Case that its subject obtains in the matrix clause, which is (also) Nominative, since *try* in German, like in English, is a subject control verb. Things are interestingly different when it comes to object control verbs like *erlauben* (permit) in German, as is illustrated in (1b). In Hornstein's (2003) analysis, the pronoun *him* is first merged in the embedded clause and then undergoes A-movement into the position where the object theta-role is assigned followed by movement to a position that assigns it Dative Case in the matrix clause.

(1)   a.   Hans versucht PRO ein groß**er** Künstler zu werden
      b.   Maria erlaubt ihm (DAT) PRO ein groß**er** Künstler (NOM) zu werden
           Maria permits him to become a great artist
      c.   *Maria erlaubt ih**m** (DAT) t ein**em** großen Künstler (DAT) zu werden

As the contrast between (1b) and (1c) shows, the Case agreement facts do not support an analysis in which the infinitival subject fails to get Case licensed in the embedded clause and is thus raised to a theta- and Case-position in the main clause. In this case, one would expect the predicate to show Dative Case agreement, contrary to fact, as shown in (1c). On the other hand, the agreement facts follow if it is assumed that PRO is assigned Nominative Case in the embedded clause with no A-movement being necessary in (1b).

B) Problems of the MTC - Binding: Object control verbs in German differ in their binding properties from what is expected under raising. It is well-known that Dative arguments fail to license Accusative anaphors in German (2a), even though they clearly c-command them (cf. Grewendorf 1989, Haider 1993), as can be seen from the Principle C-effect in (2b). The reason seems to be that anaphors are subject oriented in German (cf. Hinterhölzl 2006).

(2)   a.   Hans$_1$ zeigte sich$_{1/*2}$ ihr$_2$ im Spiegel
           John showed her himself /herself in the mirror
      b.   *Hans schickte ihr$_1$ Marias$_1$ Bild
           John sent her Mary's picture

As is illustrated in (3), an object control verb with a Dative controller can license an accusative anaphor in the embedded clause. This is completely expected under the analysis that the embedded subject is licensed as a Nominative marked null pronoun (3a). In the raising analysis of PRO the anaphor in the embedded clause is licensed by a constituent that has been moved (via a theta-position) to a position that is assigned Dative case in the matrix clause.

(3)   a.   Maria hat ihm erlaubt PRO$_1$ sich$_1$ zu rasieren
           Mary has him allowed himself to shave
      b.   Maria hat ihm$_1$ erlaubt t$_1$ sich$_1$ zu rasieren

C) The alternative account
I argue for a compositional approach to pronouns. Pronouns have an abstract nominal core, as in (4). The D-element is a function that takes this predicate as input and maps it onto the relevant

individual by imposing specific conditions both on the nature of the event argument and on the nature of the individual argument.

The first person pronoun *I* in English is represented as given in (4). The crucial presuppositional conditions for the use of this pronoun are that a) x must be a singular participant of the utterance situation (s $\subseteq$ U) where it functions as the speaker of this event [+S]. It is these features - supposed to be allocated in D - that semantically constrain the value of the denoted individual and that are spelled out with the phonological matrix *I* in English. Person is reanalysed as participant in specific situations in the discourse. In this compositional approach to pronouns, PRO can be represented as a minimal pronoun, lacking any lexical feature in D, as is illustrated in (5). The identifying features constraining its denotation are supplied via binding and control where control is re-interpreted as an Agree relation in semantic features with a syntactic antecedent in the matrix clause. The crucial denotational restriction of PRO derives from the fact that its situation argument is bound to the event argument of the higher verb.

(4)   I   (5)   PRO

                        nP   nP
D   D
[+sg] [+S]   participant (X,s)   participant (x, s)
[s $\subseteq$ U]

In this way, the referent of PRO is determined to be a participant of the event denoted by the matrix verb. PRO is anaphoric in that its event argument rather than its individual argument is bound to a syntactic antecedent. Crucially, PRO lacks any presuppositional features that can further constrain its interpretation. Its interpretation is thus crucially determined by the control properties of the matrix predicate. I will show how cases of obligatory exhaustive control (OC), cases of partial control (PC) and cases of lack of control in which PRO is taken to have an arbitrary or generic interpretation can be accounted for in the present approach.

In particular, I will address the differences in Case-agreement between OC and PC in Russian and Icelandic, reported in Landau (2008) and Sheehan (2017). In these languages, embedded predicates can agree in Case with the controller of PRO or show independent case, taken to be assigned by the infinitival Tense head, except in cases of PC where only independent case is possible. I will argue that these differences can be accounted for, if it is assumed that the situation argument is not directly bound by the higher verb but rather that PRO is assigned a value for its situation argument via an Agree relation with infinitival Tense. The differences in agreement pattern is then explained by showing that the reference situation of infinitival Tense is bound by matrix Aspect in cases of PC, but by the matrix Tense head in cases of OC.

Finally, I will discuss how the *de se* reading of PRO can be derived in what can be defined as a *de dicto* approach to the reference of PRO. Pronouns embedded in an intensional context give rise to two readings, called *de re* and *de se*. It is well-known (cf. Higginbotham 2003, Delfitto & Fiorin 2014) that PRO in OC-structures gives rise to strict *de se* readings and is immune to errors of misidentification (IEM-effects) that underlie the *de re* reading of pronouns. (6a) reports a propositional attitude involving a first person direct experience - Freud thinks "I am a good doctor".

6)   a.   Freud believes PRO to be a good doctor
        b.   Freud believes that the experiencer of his belief is a good doctor

In the present account to PRO (6a) is interpreted as given in (6b). As a sentient attitude holder Freud cannot fail to be aware that the experiencer of his belief is he himself. In other words, it is part of his experience that this epistemic attitude is directed towards himself. In our account, the direct access of the experiencer to his inner self is represented in that the denotation of PRO is established by exclusive reference to the psychological state, unmediated by a description referring to another event that could serve as an acquaintance relation and be subject to an error through mis-identification. In other words, the present analysis of PRO leaves no room for an error through misidentification. I consider this a strong argument in favor of the present account of PRO.